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Abstract: 
 
This article develops and applies a new framework for analyzing the relationship between 
institutions, cost structures, and patterns of labor-management contestation over organizational 
boundaries. Collective negotiations related to the externalization of call center jobs are compared 
across ten incumbent telecommunications firms located in Europe and the USA. All ten firms 
moved call center work to dedicated subsidiaries, temporary agencies, and domestic and offshore 
subcontractors. However, a subset of the firms later re-internalized call center jobs, in some cases 
following negotiated concessions on pay and conditions for internal workers. We argue that 
variation in outcomes can be explained by both the extent of cost differentials between internal and 
external labor and the ease of exiting internal employment relationships, which in turn affected 
patterns of contestation associated with externalization measures. Findings are based on 147 
interviews with management and union representatives, archival data on restructuring measures and 
associated collective agreements, and wage data gathered through collective agreements and 
surveys. 
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The standard, internal employment relationship has long been in decline across advanced economies, 
as firms externalize a range of jobs once performed in-house to subcontractors, temporary agencies, 
and subsidiaries.1 Firm strategies to shift work across organizational boundaries in this way have been 
linked to the deterioration of pay and working conditions and the weakening power and coverage of 
collective bargaining institutions (Lillie 2012; Holst 2014).  
 
A central concern in employment relations research has been to analyze how labor market and 
collective bargaining institutions influence these boundary decisions. Past studies can broadly be 
grouped into two research streams. First, scholars have analyzed the relationship between different 
combinations of institutional arrangements and particular externalization strategies, such as 
contingent employment contracts (e.g. Houseman and Ōsawa 2003; Olsen and Kalleberg 2004; Liu 
2015) or subcontracting arrangements (e.g. Grimshaw and Miozzo 2006; Doellgast, Batt, and 
Sørensen 2009). A second body of research has asked how labor unions and other worker 
representatives influence boundary decisions through strategies ranging from “cross-class coalitions” 
with core employers (Hassel 2014), concession bargaining in exchange for job guarantees (Flecker 
and Meil 2010), or campaigns to organize and extend institutional protections to externalized groups 
of workers (MacKenzie 2009; Greer and Hauptmeier 2012).  
These two research streams focus on different mechanisms connecting institutional environments to 
the boundary strategies of firms. The first examines how institutions at national and company level 
affect cost structures associated with externalizing work; while the second asks how and why worker 
representatives develop alternative strategies toward externalization decisions, and then access 
different power resources to exert influence over these decisions. In this paper, we incorporate both 
of these mechanisms into a framework for analyzing the relationship between institutions, cost 
structures, and the political dynamics associated with labor-management negotiations over 
organizational boundaries. We focus on two principal dimensions of cost structures that differ across 
institutional settings: the cost differential between internal and external labor and the ease of exiting 
internal employment relationships. Different combinations of these two factors are hypothesized to 
affect patterns of contestation between employers and worker representatives over externalization 
decisions.  
                                                          
1 Vidal (2011: 284) defines externalization as a “reversal of the general tendency of Fordism to internalize processes 
and employment.” We use the term here to refer to the process of moving work across organizational boundaries, from 
internal workplaces or employers to workplaces or employers that have contract-based relationships with these firms.  
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We demonstrate the usefulness of this framework in explaining differences in how worker 
representatives respond to changing boundary strategies for call center jobs, based on findings from 
a ten country comparative study of incumbent telecommunications firms. We show that unions and 
works councils placed the highest strategic priority on opposing or reversing externalization in those 
cases characterized by both large differences in labor costs between internal and external labor and 
high ease of exiting internal employment. This often resulted in significant internal concessions aimed 
at reducing the labor cost advantage of externalized worker groups, in response to employer 
benchmarking of costs and exit threats. However, past cost structures did not fully determine 
outcomes, as unions across the cases also sought to expand legislated and negotiated protections for 
these externalized worker groups. When successful, these strategies showed the best outcomes in 
terms of both limiting the expansion of poorly regulated, low-paid jobs and preserving pay and 
conditions for internal workers. 
 
Explaining patterns of contestation over organizational boundary decisions 
In this section, we develop a framework for analyzing how cost structures associated with 
externalizing work influence patterns of contestation between labor and management over boundary 
decisions. This is illustrated in Figure 1.  
The two axes in Figure 1 capture cost-based factors associated with boundary decisions. In the 
management strategy literature, the relative costs of externalizing particular tasks or jobs compared 
to performing them in-house are typically argued to be rooted either in transactions costs (Williamson 
1985) or the extent to which externalization strategies complement distinctive firm resources or 
“capabilities” (Argyres 1996; Lepak and Snell 1999). Where institutions are included in these 
“efficiency-based” theoretical models, they are primarily theorized to affect boundaries via their 
influence on governance costs (Williamson 1985) or the broader competitive strategies of firms (Hall 
and Soskice 2001). In contrast, the employment relations research that we review below has shown 
that direct or production costs associated with alternative externalization measures can be influenced 
by labor market and collective bargaining institutions at national, industry, and company levels. We 
analyze two dimensions of these costs: labor cost differences between internal and external jobs and 
the costs associated with exiting internal employment relationships.  
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The vertical axis of Figure 1 represents the size of the gap in labor costs between similar internal and 
external jobs. Past research suggests that several characteristics of institutional settings can affect this 
labor cost differential. First, the strength and scope of collective bargaining arrangements can change 
the wage premium enjoyed by internal workers in core firms or sectors (Batt and Nohara 2009); as 
well as possibilities to by-pass collective agreements using different categories of externalized work 
(Shire, Schönauer, Valverde, and Mottweiler 2009). Second, national legislation provides varying 
degrees of protection for workers on standard and non-standard contracts, including equal pay rules 
or job security provisions (Arrowsmith 2009). A further consideration is the extent to which 
subcontractors are able to evade compliance with labor laws. For example, research on contract-based 
organizational forms in the US (Weil 2014) and subcontractors using posted workers in Europe 
(Wagner 2014) has shown that these employers gain competitive advantage by systematically 
violating minimum wage and hours standards.  
The horizontal axis of Figure 1 represents variation in the ease with which employers can exit internal 
employment relationships. Institutions can influence this ease of exit via their effects on restructuring 
or switching costs. These costs are higher where there are legislated or negotiated job security 
arrangements or negotiated obstacles to substituting internal with external labor. These include, for 
example, employment protection legislation, transfer of undertakings legislation, worker consultation 
and co-determination rights (Grimshaw and Miozzo 2006), and collective bargaining agreements 
(Shire, Schönauer, Valverde, and Mottweiler 2009), including negotiated limits on the extent and 
form of outsourcing (Katz, Batt, and Keefe 2002) or agency work (Benassi 2013). Ease of exit can 
also be affected by the degree of employer dependence on the skills or commitment of internal 
workers (Doerflinger and Pulignano 2015). While we might expect this dependence to differ most 
significantly across job categories, institutions may also affect skills for similar occupations via, e.g. 
collective negotiations over work design and training investments (Lam 2002). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
This literature helps to theorize two dimensions along which direct or production costs associated 
with the externalization of similar jobs or tasks can be expected to differ across institutional settings. 
However, as in the transactions cost literature, the focus of this research has been on analyzing the 
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factors that change employers’ short-term “efficiency” considerations. Broadly, management is 
assumed to respond to institutions because of their effects on cost-based incentives associated with 
alternative boundary strategies. In contrast, we analyze the way in which different combinations of 
these (institutionally embedded) cost factors affect patterns of contestation between labor and 
management over boundary decisions. The “power and control” approach to the study of boundaries 
in the management strategy literature provides a good starting point for theorizing these relationships. 
Santos and Eisenhardt (2005: 495) argue that organizations often adopt boundaries that may not 
appear efficient in the short term, but that have long-term benefits in allowing them to maximize 
“strategic control over external forces” such as regulators, suppliers, or other market actors. They 
draw predominately on resource dependence theory, which views organizations as seeking power and 
control in markets through attempts to reduce uncertainty inherent in relationships with other 
organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  
This literature typically focuses on firms’ relations of dependence with external groups or interests, 
based on the assumption that organizations are unitary actors (Bidwell 2012: 1622). In contrast, we 
include both employers and worker representatives as major stakeholder groups within organizations, 
who experience relations of power vis-a-vis, and of dependence on, one another. Each group has 
distinctive interests in the longer term effects of boundary decisions on employment terms and 
conditions, both within an organization and across internal and externalized groups of workers. We 
apply this broader conception of inter- and intra-organizational power dynamics to analyze the 
relationship between cost structures and labor-management negotiations over organizational 
boundaries.  
We hypothesize that the intersection of labor cost differences and ease of exit will be associated with 
four different patterns of contestation over the externalization of jobs (see Figure 1). First, where cost 
differences are large between similar groups of internal and external workers and where the ease of 
exiting internal employment is high or expanding, there should be a high degree of contestation over 
boundary decisions (Quadrant II). Under these conditions, firms have large cost-based incentives to 
externalize work, while workers cannot rely on negotiated or legal constraints on exit to block 
externalization measures. To this end, management may simply seek to externalize all jobs. However, 
this is not always desirable, particularly in areas that can be strategically important or in which it is 
difficult to ensure compliance with quality standards, such as customer service.  
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Thus, another way in which management may seek to reduce costs is to try to get concessions on 
wages and working conditions from the internal workforce by benchmarking their pay and conditions 
against those of the external workforce. This kind of competitive benchmarking, linked to threats to 
internal jobs, has been observed in a range of contexts, across the international subsidiaries of MNCs 
(Marginson and Sisson 1996, Pulignano and Keune 2015) and between internal and subcontracted 
worker groups (Flecker, Haidinger, and Schönauer 2013). We posit that employers are most likely to 
use this strategy under conditions of high cost difference and high ease of exit. Using the language of 
labor market segmentation theory, externalization can more easily be used as a form of countervailing 
power against labor unions or “internalized worker norms governing the wage-effort relationship” 
(Grimshaw and Rubery 2005: 1035). Described in terms of resource dependence theories, employers 
may manipulate organizational boundaries with the aim of reducing dependence on core workers and 
their representatives and/or enhancing their power to align internal pay and conditions more closely 
with external markets (Santos and Eisenhardt 2005).  
Worker representatives also have an interest in maintaining or extending their power to determine 
wages and conditions of employment. They are most likely to view this power as being under direct 
and immediate threat where firms can easily exit internal employment relationships and where there 
are large cost advantages associated with doing so. This would lead labor to contest externalization.  
However, this could take different forms, including agreeing to internal concessions that bring 
internal pay or conditions closer to external market levels, partnering with management to improve 
the performance of internal workers, or organizing externalized groups to close the internal/external 
cost differential via raising the market wage. These strategies are not mutually exclusive. Research 
on the German metal sector has shown that the union alternated between all three of these strategies, 
following labor market reforms that deregulated the use of agency work and minijobs (thus decreasing 
their costs) (Hassel 2014; Benassi and Dorigatti 2014; Eichhorst 2015).  
In contrast, where cost differences between internal and external groups are low and exit is restricted, 
employers will typically have weaker incentives and fewer opportunities to seek changes in internal 
cost structures via benchmarking or demands for concessions (Quadrant III). When there are 
signficant constraints on exit, internal workers and their representatives may share management's 
interest in maintaining or expanding market-based contracting arrangements – particularly when this 
provides additional flexibility. High employer dependence on internal workers has been argued to 
contribute to “insider/outsider” dynamics, whereby unions representing core workers agree to 
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externalization to protect their members from insecurity associated with unstable markets (Doeringer 
and Piore 1971; Lautsch 2002). At the same time, we would not necessarily expect these dynamics 
where cost differences between internal and external groups of workers are also low, as this outcome 
is typically achieved via encompassing collective bargaining and labor market institutions (Bosch, 
Mayhew and Gautié 2010). Under these conditions, unions are less likely to view externalization as 
undermining their broader solidaristic or equity-based goals. Thus, where there are both constraints 
on exit and a low labor cost differential, externalization should be associated with low contestation – 
particularly when worker representatives are able to represent externalized groups of workers via 
collective bargaining. For example, Grimshaw et al. (2015: 10) found that union resistance to 
externalization in the Swedish public sector was low because collective agreements harmonized the 
pay differences between the private and the public sector. 
There may also be situations in which there are large cost differences between internal and external 
labor, but exit options may be restricted – for example, via strong job security arrangements for the 
internal workforce or low availability of appropriate subcontractors (Quadrant I). Alternatively, 
employers may be able to easily exit internal employment, but enjoy limited cost advantages of doing 
so due to either already low labor costs for the internal workforce or encompassing institutions that 
establish similar pay and conditions across externalized jobs (Quadrant IV). In both cases, we might 
expect conditions of moderate conflict, as employers face constraints on using benchmarking of costs 
to gain concessions, but also have either cost-based incentives or exit-based capacity for externalizing 
work. Worker representatives, in turn, should adopt a range of strategies aimed at either sustaining or 
further strengthening restrictions on exit, improving the productivity of the internal workforce, or 
organizing external groups.  
This framework provides a novel means of theorizing the mechanisms linking institutions, cost 
structures associated with externalization decisions, and patterns of contestation between labor and 
management over these decisions. Past research has looked at these different factors in isolation. The 
original contribution of our analysis is to show the ways in which they are related to one another. 
This allows us to develop a more complete and dynamic model that can be used to explain varying 
outcomes at the organizational level in different political economies. In the case studies below, we 
demonstrate the value of this framework in analyzing different patterns of contestation over the 
restructuring of telecommunications call center jobs.  
Case studies and methods 
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The findings in this paper are based on a comparison of ten incumbent telecommunications firms: 
TDC in Denmark, TeliaSonera (TS) in Sweden, Deutsche Telekom (DT) in Germany, A1 in Austria, 
France Telecom (FT) in France, Telecom Italia (TI) in Italy, BT in the UK, AT&T in the USA, Orange 
Polska (OP) in Poland, and O2 Telefónica Czech Republic (O2CR) in the Czech Republic. These 
cases represent very similar organizations undergoing parallel changes in markets and ownership 
structures, but they are located in countries with distinctive labor market and collective bargaining 
institutions. Table 1 presents background information on each company.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 shows that, despite some differences, the cases have experienced broadly similar changes in 
markets and ownership, characterized by intensified competition, declining market share, as well as 
growing pressure from private investors to increase profits and maximize “shareholder value.” This 
has encouraged firms to downsize employment; adopt multi-divisional forms to pursue product 
diversification (Sako and Jackson 2006); and increase the use of outsourcing and contingent 
employment contracts (Holst 2014). In this paper, we focus on one area of work that has been 
significantly affected by these developments: call centers responsible for customer contact in the 
sales, service, billing, and technical support areas. Labor intensive call center work is increasingly 
mobile due to declining ICT costs. Moreover, it can be performed cheaply by domestic and offshore 
subcontractors in the growing international outsourcing industry (Taylor and Bain 2004; Batt, 
Holman, and Holtgrewe 2009). 
At each company, we conducted semi-structured interviews (147 in total) with managers and worker 
representatives. The interviews were conducted both by phone and face-to-face; in most cases, the 
interviews were held in the native language of the interview partners.2 We also distributed a survey 
to union and works council representatives at each organization that included standardized questions 
concerning collective bargaining institutions, negotiations over and outcomes associated with 
restructuring measures, and pay structures for call center jobs.3 Interviews were transcribed and, 
together with site visit notes, coded using the qualitative data analysis software atlas.ti. Interview 
findings were then analyzed by grouping quotes by codes, preparing comprehensive reports for each 
                                                          
2 At TDC and TS, interviews were conducted in English; and at O2CR through an interpreter. 
3 In Denmark, management provided data on pay structures as unions did not have an overview of pay across locations; 
while in the other countries union representatives provided this data via the survey, supplemented by collective 
agreements. The survey questionnaire is available on the Academia.com profile of the authors. 
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case, and then comparing emergent themes across the cases. Finally, we produced a report 
summarizing our findings, which was both sent to all individuals interviewed and presented at a 
dissemination conference attended by interviewees; as well as at several meetings organized by 
national and international unions representing telecommunications workers (Authors 2013). 
Responses of representatives from the case study firms to the report and at conferences helped to 
correct errors of fact, as well as to confirm the resonance of our comparative analysis with stakeholder 
experience. 
 
 
Case study comparison 
Our comparison of the cases proceeds in three parts. First, we summarize the boundary strategies 
adopted by the ten case study firms. Second, based on the framework developed above (Figure 1), 
we compare the two dimensions of cost savings and ease of exit associated with these strategies across 
the ten cases. We demonstrate the value of this framework in explaining different patterns of labor-
management contestation in four cases corresponding to its ideal-typical quadrants, as well as 
alternative outcomes in terms of re-internalization and concessions. Third, we examine the role of 
worker representatives in seeking to shift these cost structures through organizing strategies aimed at 
closing gaps in regulation and improving pay and conditions for externalized groups. 
 
Boundary strategies of case study firms 
The case study firms externalized call center work through four alternative strategies: ownership of 
dedicated call center subsidiaries, use of temporary agencies to staff internal call centers, domestic 
subcontracting, and offshore subcontracting. The shift of work to call center subsidiaries is a partial 
form of externalization: although these subsidiaries are still owned by the incumbent firms, they 
typically are organized as internal subcontractors, responsible for selling call center services to their 
“parent” and in some cases to other companies. 
Figure 2 illustrates the proportion of work externalized through each of these strategies by firm in the 
late 2000s. TDC, DT, TI, and OP moved call center work to dedicated subsidiaries, with all consumer-
segment call center jobs at DT and OP located in these subsidiaries. TDC, TS, A1, BT, OP, and O2CR 
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used moderate to high numbers of agency staff in their internal call centers; DT, FT, and TI used 
small numbers of agency staff; while AT&T did not use temporary agencies. Those companies that 
relied on moderate to high levels of subcontracting (20-50% of jobs) either primarily used domestic 
subcontractors (DT and TI) or offshore subcontractors (FT, BT, and AT&T). TDC, TS, A1, and OP 
did not subcontract (in this time period), and O2CR subcontracted fewer than 10% of jobs. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Table 2 compares major changes in organizational boundary strategies, covering the ten year period 
from 2005 to 2015. This shows that seven of the companies moved jobs that had been externalized 
back in-house. In four of these cases – TDC, DT, BT, and AT&T – these changes were associated 
with negotiated concessions by unions and other worker representatives aimed at re-internalizing call 
center jobs or preventing further outsourcing. The remaining three cases – TS, TI, and FT – show 
more minor or no concessions.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
The variation observed across the cases in the extent and form of externalization can be attributed in 
part to distinctive combinations of labor and restructuring cost structures in different institutional 
settings. For example, TDC was historically able to pay agency workers lower wage rates than its 
internal staff, as agencies were covered by lower cost collective agreements. In contrast, at DT, 
outsourcing call center work offered more significant cost savings, as agency workers were covered 
by equal pay rules, while subcontractors had much lower pay rates due to very low bargaining 
coverage and no national minimum wage. Constraints on exit from internal employment relationships 
could also affect the form of externalization. DT initially faced significant short-term constraints from 
job security and location security agreements. However, management was able to shift call center 
jobs into lower cost subsidiaries, in some cases later selling these subsidiaries. O2CR represents a 
contrasting case where weak job security allowed the company to externalize by downsizing its call 
center workforce while simultaneously increasing its use of temporary agencies, some of which hired 
former O2CR workers. These types of institutionally-influenced cost factors exerted some influence 
over boundary strategies at each of the firms. 
However, the comparison in Table 2 shows that these boundary strategies could change over time, 
often following negotiations between management and worker representatives. This raises further 
questions concerning the political dynamics associated with these negotiations. Why in a subset of 
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companies were boundary decisions a central focus of collective bargaining, with agreements to re-
internalize work or to halt further externalization, while in others they were not? Why did some of 
these agreements involve significant concessions on pay and conditions for internal workers, while 
in other cases there were no concessions? We argue that these differences can be explained by 
analyzing how different combinations of labor and restructuring cost structures influenced patterns 
of labor-management contestation over boundary decisions. 
 
Comparing contestation over boundaries 
We apply the framework developed earlier in the paper to explain variation in patterns of contestation 
across the cases. First, we classify each case as low, moderate, or high along the two axes of Figure 
1: cost savings associated with externalization and ease of exiting internal employment (Table 3).  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The classification of cost differences is based on data on pay levels for similar groups of internal and 
externalized workers, gathered through the union surveys and interviews (see also Figure 4 below); 
as well as qualitative findings concerning differences in broader terms and conditions of employment. 
Cost differences were predominately affected by five factors: internal pay distribution, the presence 
and scope of equal pay rules for temporary agencies, bargaining coverage and strength for domestic 
subcontractors, availability of offshore subcontractors, and the presence of centralized collective 
bargaining in incumbent firms that extended pay and conditions negotiated for traditional “core” 
workers to call center subsidiaries. Thus, for example, TS faced lower cost differences between 
internal and externalized workers compared to TDC due to more compressed internal pay, stronger 
equal pay rules for temporary agency workers in Sweden, as well as higher bargaining coverage for 
subcontractors. FT, BT, and AT&T are classified as having ‘high’ cost differences because they had 
access to a significant market of offshore services in English-speaking Asian countries and French-
speaking African countries, offering cost savings of between 30 and 75 percent. At TI, O2CR, and 
OP, cost differences are ‘moderate’ due to both relatively compressed internal pay rates and 
(particularly at TI) some institutional protections bringing up pay and conditions for major categories 
of externalized workers. 
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The classification of ease of exit from internal employment relationships is based on consideration of 
legislated and negotiated employment protections or job security agreements, as well as other 
arrangements that limited exit such as civil servant status and consultation or co-determination rights 
of works councils. In addition, three of the case studies – TDC, TS, and DT – outsourced significant 
numbers of jobs in different areas via worker transfer to subcontractors. This represents a particular 
form of exit that allowed these firms to by-pass other negotiated or legislated employment 
protections.   
We classify the ease of exit as low, moderate, or high based on the strength of negotiated or legal 
limits on downsizing or moving jobs, which affected restructuring or switching costs associated with 
externalizing work. For example, A1 and FT both had low ease of exit due to high proportions of 
civil servants with lifetime job security, as well as relatively strong legislated employment 
protections. TDC is classified as ‘moderate’ because it had high downsizing costs associated with 
both a relatively generous notice period and re-training provisions, as well as some stronger 
employment protections for former civil servants – while TS is classified as ‘high’ because 
management unilaterally exited similar job security agreements in 2008 (described below). BT faced 
moderate constraints on exit due to job security agreements committing management to retrain 
workers and place those whose jobs had been cut in other parts of the company, as well as agreements 
limiting the percentage of work offshored and handled by temporary agencies – which were relatively 
transparent and easy for the union to police. While AT&T also had negotiated limits on offshoring, 
the company was able to by-pass these agreements due to the presence of multiple bargaining units 
and poorly coordinated collective agreements with widely varying terms and conditions. These 
examples illustrate the way in which ‘ease of exit’ was influenced not only by formal agreements and 
laws, but also by the capacity of employers to avoid or exploit loopholes in these institutions.  
Figure 3 illustrates how each case maps on to Figure 1, using the classification developed in Table 3 
above. Four cases broadly conform to our “ideal-typical” quadrants in the framework: France 
Telecom (I), AT&T (II), A1 (III), and TeliaSonera (IV); with the other cases having intermediate 
positions on at least one of the two axes. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
At AT&T, cost savings associated with externalization and the ease of exiting internal employment 
relationships were both high. Pay at subcontractors, who have no collective bargaining in the US, 
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was significantly lower than at AT&T internal call centers, with a difference of up to $13/hour. In 
addition, work could be further offshored to destinations such as India or the Philippines, where 
wages were a fraction of those paid in the US. Beyond these wage differences, benefits – including 
most notably health insurance – added to the cost of internal workers.   
Ease of exit in the US is high overall due to weak legislated employment protections. There were 
some restrictions on subcontracting in AT&T’s collective agreements with the Communication 
Workers of America (CWA). However, AT&T was able to sidestep these provisions by using 
loopholes in the agreements, and by adopting complicated restructuring measures that made it 
difficult for the union to verify whether management was complying with their terms. The presence 
of multiple bargaining units across AT&T exacerbated this problem, as workers could be moved 
across regions and collective agreements with different provisions regarding outsourcing. Union 
representatives observed that management also offered generous redundancy plans “to eliminate 
certain whole titles” and shift the work to subcontractors (Interview, CWA representative, 06/05/13).  
Under these conditions, outsourcing was strongly contested by the CWA. The lack of bargaining 
presence in subcontractors, with low union density overall in the US, meant that organizing 
externalized workers was not viable. Instead, the union sought to both increase costs of exit and 
reduce the cost disadvantage of the internal workforce.  
Our contract actually says, when you’re going to do any contracting you’re 
supposed to notify the union the intents of that. But the intent was for me to come 
up with alternatives, maybe the union can come up with ideas on how to help them 
meet that need [in terms of finding cost savings in-house]. (CWA representative, 
03/14/12) 
In one example of these strategies, the CWA formed a joint committee with management in 2001-
2004 aimed at narrowing the cost differential between internal and offshored call center work. This 
resulted in proposals to create a new job title for employees handling lower revenue work and allow 
temporary work; as well as a pilot project that reduced absenteeism and improved productivity via 
job rotation and flexible scheduling. Then in 2004 contract negotiations, the CWA sought an 
agreement to in-source 3,000 DSL help desk jobs that had been offshored to Accenture in India. 
Management agreed to bring this work back to the US, in CWA represented call centers, when the 
contract with Accenture expired in 2007 – but only on condition that the union negotiate a 
“competitive” set of conditions for the work. The work was internalized to five new call centers, 
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under a new job title in the “Internet Services Agreement” with starting pay of close to $10/hour. By 
2013, there were 15 of these Internet Services call centers employing 3,600 workers, and average pay 
had increased to $14/hour.  
While the union adopted a range of strategies in negotiations with AT&T over boundary decisions, it 
consistently contested externalization with the objective of bringing jobs back in-house. The main 
means of doing so targeted reducing the cost disadvantages of the unionized workforce through 
concessions and partnership aimed at improving the productivity of internal workers. Management 
was able to use benchmarking of costs to gain these agreements, arguing for the need to introduce 
pay and conditions that were competitive with external, market-based labor costs. At the same time, 
the union was able to resist direct concessions for existing workers and to gain some improvements 
in pay and conditions over time for workers covered by “second tier” agreements. 
A1 in Austria typifies the opposite set of conditions, in which both cost differences between internal 
and external labor and the ease of exiting internal employment were relatively low. A1 hired almost 
all new call center staff onto temporary agency contracts. Nearly 70% of the call center workforce 
were on these contracts – which were often renewed indefinitely, with some workers remaining in 
this status for decades. However, these temporary workers were entitled to the same employment 
terms and conditions as the permanent internal workforce due to strong equal pay and treatment 
provisions in national law and collective agreements. A1 still gained some savings, primarily due to 
lower dismissal costs compared to the permanent workforce, as well as less generous pensions and 
benefits. However, the labor cost differential was significantly smaller than that associated with 
outsourcing or offshoring at AT&T. Other potential forms of externalization also offered lower cost 
savings due to Austria’s more encompassing collective bargaining institutions, which regulate pay 
and conditions at call center subcontractors; as well as centralized bargaining at A1 and in the 
telecommunications sector more generally, guaranteeing relatively standardized pay rates for 
equivalent jobs. For language reasons, offshoring is also not as readily available to Austrian as to US 
firms. 
In addition, management’s ability to exit internal employment was significantly restricted by the large 
proportion of civil servants at A1, who enjoyed lifetime job security. Nearly 60% of the workforce 
had this civil servant status in the mid-2010s. In addition, job security provisions in collective 
agreements, relatively strong legislated employment protections, and works council oversight in 
dismissal decisions raised restructuring costs associated with downsizing or relocating jobs. While 
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management was able to reduce internal employment over time, typically relying on voluntary 
redundancy or retirements, it was not able to quickly and unilaterally exit its internal employment 
relationships. 
These conditions led to a situation of low labor-management conflict over externalization measures 
at A1. Management was not able to benchmark costs between external and internal groups of workers 
to argue for concessions, as these cost differences were marginal. In addition, there was no 
widespread perception that external workers were being used to undermine standards, as they were 
covered by strong institutional and negotiated protections. In interviews, union representatives noted 
that they were not happy with the high use of agency work, particularly the practice of keeping 
workers on these contracts for long periods of time:  
For me, this is not satisfactory, because I think it’s sick that you need agency workers at all, 
but when you’re in the stock market, financially driven, it looks better, as though you were 
slimmer. (A1 works councilor, 26/10/11). 
However, the union was able to represent agency workers’ interests, organizing them to join the union 
and intervening on their behalf in employment disputes. In one case described by a union 
representative, a temporary worker was dismissed “because management did not like him,” and the 
works council succeeded in getting him reinstated.  
France Telecom and TeliaSonera correspond to the different types of mixed case. FT had a high 
proportion of civil servants – around 70% in 2012 – which, together with strong national employment 
protections in France, effectively made it impossible to dismiss internal workers. At the same time, 
cost differences between internal and external labor could be significant. In 2010, FT operated around 
20 internal call centers (14,000 workers) and subcontracted with 20 external call centers (6,000 
workers) – around half of which were located in Morocco and Senegal. Call center subcontractors in 
France are covered by a sectoral agreement that sets the minimum salary at the national minimum 
wage. This was only 12% lower than starting salaries in FT’s call centers in the early 2010s, but 
overall labor costs were lower due to higher turnover (and thus a larger percentage of workers at the 
starting salary level), a large proportion of part-time workers, and less generous pensions and other 
benefits. There was a much larger gap between internal and offshored workers: management 
estimated that labor costs in offshore call centers were on average 75% lower than those in-house 
(Interview, FT manager, 08/03/10), with typically no union representation. 
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Under these conditions, FT had relatively strong cost-based incentives to externalize work, but also 
strong constraints on exiting internal employment relationships. Management initially responded by 
adopting a series of draconian internal restructuring measures explicitly aimed at increasing voluntary 
resignations (Diehl and Doublét 2010). However, this was halted after a wave of suicides at the 
company gained widespread negative media attention. Unions were critical of outsourcing, and had 
formed a committee within the company’s “economic commission” to consult on this practice, with 
the aim of gaining commitments to reduce the volume of work outsourced. One union representative 
described a long process of trying to get information on the volume of work outsourced and associated 
costs – which they succeed in getting in the end by convincing management they were committed to 
working with them to internalize jobs under good conditions:  
This is really something that we won. It took time, it took a lot of confidence. We 
had to say to them: no, we will not use this to embarrass you in front of your 
competitors or create difficulties in the press. We want to use it because we think 
that employees are better inside the Group [FT], that they are treated better when 
they are employees of the Group than when they are subcontracted outside of the 
group. That is the reality.  (CGT representative, 30/06/10) 
Indeed, FT reduced the volume of call center work outsourced in the late 2010s. However, 
managers and union representatives attributed this to declining call volumes. Cutting outsourcing 
was the easiest adjustment strategy due to the high costs associated with downsizing. Although the 
FT unions sought to reduce outsourcing – as in all of the cases – they did not place a high priority 
on this in negotiations or through direct action and protests. Notably, the unions did not seek to 
make concessions to reverse outsourcing, nor did management use benchmarking of costs between 
internal and externalized workers to argue for changes in internal pay and conditions.  
At TS, similar to A1, labor cost differences were low between internal and external workers 
because of encompassing legislation and collective bargaining. Temporary agency workers are 
covered by strong equal pay and treatment rules as well as collective agreements, with high union 
density in this sector overall. In addition, most major call center subcontractors are signatories to 
their industry’s sectoral collective agreement, as well as having strong local union representation. 
Union representatives estimated that the pay difference between call center workers at TS and at 
major subcontractors was between 2,000-5,000 Krona a month, which amounts to $1.40-3.40/hour 
lower base pay. However, subcontractors also typically had a higher sales commission component 
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that narrowed this gap. In addition, the broader terms of collective agreements were similar, with 
some stronger provisions in the call center agreement – for example, prohibitions on split 
schedules.  
At the same time, restrictions on exit at TS were low. The unions had negotiated past collective 
agreements giving redundant employees a generous package of benefits, which ensured no 
involuntary dismissals and gave employees three years to find new jobs within or outside the 
company. However, management unilaterally ended this agreement in 2008. In addition, TS 
transferred close to 11,000 technical and business service employees to subcontractors between 
2001 and 2007. This demonstrated the ease with which management could use employee transfer 
to exit internal employment relationships. 
Relatively small differences in pay meant that management could not easily use benchmarking of 
these costs to demand pay concessions. It also meant that the union also did not view externalization 
as a major threat to broader equity goals or to sustaining union membership, as externalized 
workers were covered by collective agreements. At the same time, union representatives at TS were 
concerned with the expansion of subcontracting and temporary agency work in different time 
periods, and tried to encourage re-internalization where possible. Around 2,000 call center 
employees were transferred to subcontractors between 1998 and 1999, when the company went 
through a major consolidation of its call center operations. It continued to use the subcontractors 
for several years, but gradually replaced them with temporary agency workers. By 2011, 40% of 
the workforce in customer service jobs and 30% in sales or support jobs were on temporary 
contracts. The union sought to convince management to internalize these workers, using the 
business case that the customer service quality and productivity of the permanent workforce was 
higher:  
3-4 years ago we had perhaps a thousand or more by Manpower for instance. We of course 
wanted them to be employed by the company. [...] we said, employ them in-house instead. 
I think they, the management, decided to do that because they noticed that the quality that 
they get from the employees was bigger if they are employed by us [...] The company 
said: we are getting much higher customer satisfaction if we employ them ourselves, even 
if it costs a little bit more. (Unionen representative, 27/10/14) 
By 2015, the proportion of temporary agency workers in TS’s call centers had declined from over 
30% to 18%, as more of these workers were shifted onto permanent contracts.  
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This comparison illustrates that different combinations of labor and restructuring cost structures could 
have a significant impact on patterns of labor-management contestation over boundaries. While there 
was some contestation in the four cases, AT&T stands out for both the high strategic priority the 
union placed on limiting or reversing outsourcing, as well as the size of concessions.  
 
The relationship between wage differentials and concessions 
In four of the cases – TDC, DT, BT, and AT&T – worker representatives negotiated significant 
concessions in exchange for agreements to reverse externalization or halt outsourcing plans (see 
Table 2 above). These cases had in common large cost differences and moderate to high ease of exit. 
This suggests that these cost differences are particularly important for understanding the political 
dynamics of concession bargaining over externalization. A closer examination of pay structures 
across the firms provides further support for this argument. Figure 4 illustrates starting, typical, and 
top pay levels for in-house call centers, call center subsidiaries or second tier contracts, and 
subcontractors where these figures were available. We include pay levels for agency workers where 
these rates were allowed to deviate from those for equivalent permanent jobs. At A1 and O2CR, we 
only have pay figures for in-house call centers. We were not able to obtain pay data from OP. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
Figure 4 shows that TDC, DT, BT, and AT&T are distinctive in having very high pay for their in-
house call center workers relative to call centers in other European countries. The other case study 
companies had lower and/or more compressed pay scales for in-house staff, and smaller differences 
compared to pay rates for externalized groups of workers. In addition, concessionary or second-tier 
agreements had the effect of bringing down pay levels in these four cases (at least for some groups 
of internal workers) closer to levels in the external market in each country. TDC’s subsidiary Call 
Center Europe had pay rates similar to those at subcontractors. DT’s call center subsidiary DTKS, 
BT’s new lower tier job titles, and AT&T’s new call centers under the Internet Services Agreement 
all paid from 30% to 50% less compared to past agreements. All of these agreements were strongly 
influenced by employer benchmarking of labor costs and terms of collective agreements or individual 
contracts for similar externalized call center jobs. 
This further supports our argument that where cost differences between internal and externalized 
labor were larger, employers were more likely to seek concessions to reduce internal pay and 
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conditions to the level of the external market. However, worker representatives across our cases also 
adopted a range of strategies aimed at bringing up pay and conditions in externalized workplaces – 
essentially raising this market-based benchmark. Thus, while employers were able to manipulate 
boundaries to gain power over internal pay and conditions, worker representatives also pursued 
strategies aimed at limiting that power by extending institutional protections to externalized groups. 
Across the cases, we see examples of these strategies. The unions at BT increased union membership 
rates among temporary agency workers through organizing and advocacy work, and led a series of 
campaigns aimed at “closing the loopholes” in equal pay rules for these workers. At Orange Polska, 
unions successfully opposed management’s plans to introduce lower pay rates for workers transferred 
to the company’s new call center subsidiary in 2010, using member mobilization and protests to 
improve their bargaining position.4  
Telecom Italia represents the most successful example of these strategies. Historically, TI’s major 
subcontractor Atesia employed most of its workers on temporary “freelance” contracts, with low 
levels of pay – mainly based on performance – and lower social contributions. In the early 2000s, 
following mounting public pressure and worker protests, union representatives and TI management 
negotiated an agreement whereby TI purchased 20% of Atesia and integrated 1,350 workers into its 
subsidiary Telecontact, converting all freelance contracts into training positions and agency contracts.  
However, Atesia – similar to other subcontractors – continued to employ many workers on freelance 
contracts, and the unions started lobbying the government to restrict their use. In 2006, a new legal 
ordinance came into force, which required companies to offer inbound call center agents permanent 
contracts. Atesia subsequently agreed to turn the freelance contracts of inbound call center agents 
onto permanent, part-time contracts, at a lower pay grade (Panici 2013). A second ordinance came 
into force two years later, which required evidence of “autonomous work” for outbound agents on 
freelance contracts. Atesia then agreed to move its 6,000 outbound freelancers onto permanent 
contracts, mainly with part-time or apprenticeship status. However, the company immediately started 
hiring freelancers again. The unions responded with a series of strikes, as well as by helping 
individual workers to bring their cases to court (Info Atesia 2008).  
These campaigns had the combined effect of raising pay and conditions in the call center 
subcontractor sector, and in particular at a major TI subcontractor. They were also associated with 
                                                          
4 See (Authors 2015) for more detail on these case studies.  
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some internalization of call center work with minor initial concessions for internalized workers, 
which were then mitigated by the union. Thus, this represents a successful example of worker 
representatives adopting a series of strategies aimed at extending negotiated and legal protections to 
externalized workers, effectively shrinking the cost differential between internal and external labor.  
It is noteworthy that TI falls squarely in the middle of our framework (Figure 3), with both moderate 
cost savings associated with externalization and moderate ease of exit. Pay for internal TI call center 
workers is also relatively low and compressed in international comparison (Figure 4). As we have 
argued, these conditions make it more difficult for employers to use benchmarking of costs to gain 
concessions – thus altering the political dynamics associated with negotiations over re-internalization 
of work. However, unions also played a central role in further increasing the costs of external labor 
by organizing new groups of workers and constraining exit through increased internal job security at 
TI and its subcontractors. Italian unions were able to achieve these objectives due to (relatively) 
encompassing collective bargaining institutions and high union density in externalized workplaces, 
as well as through activist leadership by militant unions committed to pursuing broader equity goals. 
This demonstrates the importance of both strategic choices and broader power resources in explaining 
different outcomes from patterns of contestation over organizational boundaries. 
 
Conclusions 
This article contributes to debates in the employment relations literature concerning the mechanisms 
connecting labor market and collective bargaining institutions to organizational boundary decisions. 
We have shown that cost structures play a role not just in how employers weigh the efficiency of 
alternative boundary decisions, but also in patterns of contestation between labor and management 
associated with changes in boundaries over time. The outcome of conflict over boundaries proved to 
have significant implications for pay and conditions for different groups of workers. Under conditions 
of large differences in labor costs between internal and external workers and high ease of exit from 
internal employment relationships, externalization was most strongly contested by worker 
representatives – but also associated with significant concessions from the internal workforce in 
exchange for re-internalization of work. 
Our empirical findings are not intended to represent a typology of “national models” of contestation 
that can be generalized across sectors and workplaces in the countries studied. Instead, the case 
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studies illustrate the usefulness of the framework that we have developed in this paper for analyzing 
the effects of heterogeneous national, sectoral, and company-level institutions on the political 
dynamics of collective bargaining over boundary decisions at the organizational level. This study is 
the first to gather equivalent wage data and information on externalization practices from such closely 
matched companies across a large number of countries, in a setting in which parallel changes in 
markets and ownership encouraged rapid and radical restructuring of work. This has given us a unique 
opportunity to examine the relationship between cost structures and patterns of contestation between 
labor and management over boundary strategies, with some degree of control for competing 
explanations.  
Further research should seek to test the generalizability of the arguments developed here in other 
organizational and employment settings. Our findings suggest that where cost differences are largest 
between core and externalized workplaces and ability to exit is high, there will be more downgrading 
of pay and conditions over time. These changes are likely to involve concession bargaining where 
unions are present – but may also be expected in workplaces with no or weak union presence. For 
example, Weil (2014) observes similar dynamics in large, non-union US workplaces, where the shift 
of work into complex networks of suppliers has contributed to increasingly market-driven wage 
setting processes. Over time, these processes lead to downward pressure on pay and conditions for 
workers in easily rationalized jobs, contributing to growing inequality at a societal level.  
More generally, our findings provide empirical support for the argument that encompassing 
institutions are a crucial tool for worker representatives as they seek to preserve high pay and 
conditions in large firms and across their production chains. In all of our case studies, employers 
sought to exploit opportunities to reduce labor costs, where they were available, by moving work 
across organizational boundaries. In cases where cost differences were large and exit options were 
increasing, unions came under pressure to reduce internal costs through concessions. The example of 
Telecom Italia demonstrates that this is not the only way in which cost differences between segments 
can be reduced: TI’s unions were successful in improving pay and conditions at call center 
subsidiaries and some subcontractors through organizing and legislative campaigns. Worker 
representatives pursued these strategies across the cases. The conditions for success were rooted in 
their ability to mobilize heterogeneous power resources to increase the cost of externalization and 
establish new barriers to exit. 
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Table 1. Background on the case studies 
 
Country 
Total 
employees 
2010* 
Year 
first 
public 
share 
offering 
Year fully 
privatized 
or (% 
state 
ownership
) 
Year 
market 
liberalized 
(fixed-line 
segment) 
Market 
share 
(fixed-line 
segment) 
2010-11* 
Union 
density
** 
TDC Denmark 9,200 1994 1998 1996 67% 75% 
TeliaSonera (TS) Sweden 8,937 2000 (51%) 1993 59% 85% 
A1 Austria 9,717 2002 (28%) 1998 55% 65% 
Deutsche Telekom 
(DT) 
Germany 
123,174 1995 (32%) 1998 52% 55% 
France Telecom 
(FT) 
France 
102,552 1997 (27%) 1998 51% 
N/A 
Telecom Italia 
(TI) 
Italy 
57,994 1997 2003 1997 56% (26%) 
BT UK 79,800 1984 1993 1990 39% 90% 
AT&T USA 143,898 1885 1885 1996 40% 88% 
O2 Telefónica 
Czech Republic 
(O2CR) 
Czech 
Republic  7,114 1995 2005 2001 60% 38% 
Orange Polska 
(OP) 
Poland 
25,687 1998 2010 2003 57% 25% 
 
Source: *European Commission (2010); except AT&T: Statista (2014) **union surveys (TI 
membership is higher than reported here, as this figure does not include members of UIL and UGL) 
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Table 2. Changes in organizational boundaries (2005-2015), and associated changes in pay and 
conditions for internal workers 
 
Measures to re-internalize work, halt 
externalization plans, or significantly 
expand externalization 
Associated changes in pay and conditions for 
internal workers, sought or secured in 
negotiations 
TDC 
1) 2011: all temp agency workers made 
permanent 
2) 2012-13: Mgt agreed to halt outsourcing 
plans 
3) 2014-15: Mgt outsourced 50% existing 
call center workforce 
1) unpaid lunches and reduced terms and 
conditions for new hires/internalized temps 
2) flexible working time model introduced 
3) Mgt sought further concessions on pay for 
lunches and breaks; reduced pensions; and cuts 
in overtime pay to halt planned outsourcing – 
when union did not agree, outsourcing was 
carried out 
TeliaSonera 
2013-15: temp agency workers reduced 
from >30% to 18% of workforce  
none 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
1) 2007: Mgt agreed not to outsource new 
subsidiary 
2) 2012-14: subcontracting reduced from 
40% to 30%; % temp agency reduced; 
internal employment stabilized 
1) pay reduced by 30% for new hires and 
working time increased for existing workers; 
more variable pay; weekend work introduced 
2) flexible working time model introduced; part-
time work increased; more intensive 
performance monitoring allowed 
A1 none N/A 
France 
Telecom 
2010-12: Amount of work outsourced 
declined with declining call volume 
none 
Telecom 
Italia 
1) mid-2000s: 1,350 workers from a 
subcontractor moved to TI subsidiary; 
freelancers converted to training, probation, 
part-time and agency contracts 
2) 2008-12: all temp agency workers in 
subsidiary made permanent 
1) slightly lower initial pay grades for 
internalized agency workers 
2) internalized workers on part-time contracts 
progressively moved onto full-time contracts  
BT 
1) 2007: some temp agency workers made 
permanent 
2) 2011: Mgt agreed to internalize 600-900 
offshored jobs  
 
1) new pay grade with lower pay and conditions 
for internalized agency workers 
2) new pay grade with lower pay and conditions 
for jobs created through in-sourcing 
AT&T 2007-13: 3,600 offshore jobs internalized  
new pay grade with lower pay and conditions for 
jobs created through in-sourcing 
O2 
Telefónica 
Czech 
Republic  
none 
N/A 
Orange 
Polska 
none 
N/A 
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Table 3. Comparison of cost structures associated with externalization 
 
Cost differences between internal and externalized 
workers 
Ease of exit from internal employment relationships 
TDC 
HIGH 
- equal pay rules for temporary agency workers 
allowed lower pay if covered by collective agreement 
- decentralized bargaining allowed wage 
differentiation in call center and other subsidiaries  
- minority of subcontractors covered by a sectoral or 
company-level collective agreement 
MODERATE 
- weak legislated employment protections  
- negotiated employment protections increased costs 
associated with downsizing; stronger protections 
covered former civil servants (35% of workforce) 
- worker transfer to subcontractors moderately used 
 
TeliaSonera 
LOW 
- equal pay rules and high bargaining coverage for 
temporary agencies  
- majority of subcontractors covered by a sectoral 
agreement establishing minimum pay and conditions 
HIGH 
- strong negotiated employment protections in the past; 
however, employer unilaterally exited from these 
agreements in 2008 
- worker transfer to subcontractors widely used  
Deutsche 
Telekom 
HIGH 
- equal pay rules and collective bargaining for 
temporary agencies  
- decentralized bargaining at DT allowed wage 
differentiation in call center subsidiaries 
- very low bargaining coverage for subcontractors, 
with no national minimum wage (before 2015) 
MODERATE 
- strong legislated employment protections and job 
security in collective agreements; some civil servants 
with very strong protections (35% of workforce)  
- works councils have co-determination rights over 
dismissal decisions 
- worker transfer to subcontractors widely used 
A1 
LOW 
- equal pay rules and collective bargaining for 
temporary agencies 
- all subcontractors covered by a sectoral agreement 
establishing minimum pay and conditions 
LOW 
- strong legislated employment protections and job 
security in collective agreements; high proportion of 
civil servants with very strong protections (60%)  
- works councils have consultation rights over dismissal 
decisions 
France 
Telecom 
HIGH 
- equal pay rules and collective bargaining for 
temporary agencies  
- majority of subcontractors covered by a sectoral 
agreement establishing minimum pay and conditions at 
national minimum wage 
- availability of offshore subcontractors with very low 
labor costs 
LOW 
- strong legislated employment protections and  job 
security in collective agreements; high proportion of 
civil servants with very strong protections (70%) 
 
 
Telecom 
Italia 
MODERATE 
- equal pay rules for temp agencies, but only based on 
sectoral agreement (not higher paid company 
agreement) 
- high bargaining coverage for domestic 
subcontractors, but they can choose lower cost 
agreements and use cheaper freelance contracts 
- decentralized bargaining at TI allowed wage 
differentiation in call center subsidiary 
MODERATE 
- strong legislated employment protections, strong job 
security in collective agreements  
- negotiated limits on % temp agency work  
 
BT 
HIGH 
- equal pay rules for temp agencies introduced in 2011, 
but could be by-passed using pay between assignment 
contracts 
- availability of offshore subcontractors with very low 
labor costs 
MODERATE 
- moderate legislated employment protections, 
moderate job security in collective agreements 
- agreed limits on % offshored and agency workers 
AT&T 
HIGH 
- no equal pay rules for temp agencies or collective 
agreements for subcontractors 
- decentralized bargaining at AT&T allowed wage 
differentiation in call centers with lower-tier 
agreements 
HIGH 
- weak legislated employment protections, relatively 
weak job security in collective agreements 
- negotiated limits on offshoring and practices to 
replace domestic workers; but employer used a range of 
strategies to get around these rules 
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- availability of offshore subcontractors with very low 
labor costs 
O2 Telefónica 
Czech 
Republic  
MODERATE 
- equal pay rules for temp agencies, but did not cover 
flexible benefits 
- no collective bargaining for subcontractors  
HIGH 
- weak legislated and negotiated employment 
protections  
Orange 
Polska 
MODERATE 
- no equal pay for temp agencies, pay 30-60% less  
- central collective agreement extended to call center 
subsidiary 
HIGH 
- weak legislated and negotiated employment 
protections; though some job security protections for 
call center subsidiary 
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Figure 1. Predicted effects of labor and restructuring cost structures on patterns of union-management 
contestation over externalization 
Labor cost 
differences 
between internal 
and externalized 
workers 
High Moderate contestation: 
- Worker representatives view 
externalization as a low threat to 
internal jobs due to restricted exit; 
but as a significant threat to equity 
goals due to large cost 
differentials.  
- Employers may seek to 
externalize to gain cost savings, 
but have limited ability to use 
benchmarking of costs to gain 
internal concessions. 
I 
High contestation:  
- Worker representatives view 
externalization as a significant threat 
to internal jobs and equity goals due 
to large cost differentials and high 
ease of exit.   
- Employers may use benchmarking 
of cost differences with external 
worker groups and exit threats to 
gain internal concessions. 
 
II 
Low Low contestation:  
- Worker representatives view 
externalization as a low threat to 
internal jobs and to broader equity 
goals due to low cost differentials 
and restricted exit. 
- Employers may seek to 
externalize to gain flexibility, but 
cannot use it as leverage for 
internal concessions. 
III 
Moderate contestation:  
- Worker representatives view 
externalization as a moderate threat 
to internal jobs due to ease of exit, 
but not to broader equity goals due to 
low cost differentials. 
- Employers may use exit threats to 
gain labor cooperation to improve the 
productivity and quality of internal 
labor, but cannot use externalization 
as leverage for internal concessions. 
IV 
  Low High 
  Ease of exiting internal employment 
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Figure 2. Estimated % of employees externalized in call centers (consumer segment), 2010-2012 
 
Note: These figures are based on estimates provided by interviewees, who differed in their ability to give 
precise numbers of jobs externalized in each category. The reference year differs between the cases, but is 
roughly in the 2010-2012 period. The % subcontracted at TI is a conservative estimate, with up to 70% of call 
volume subcontracted in some areas of work. Agency workers at DT, TI, and OP were used in the subsidiaries, 
while those at other companies were used in internal call centers. The figures for % subcontracted at FT, BT, 
and AT&T include both domestic and offshore subcontracting.  
0
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Figure 3. Comparison of cases based on framework in Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Labor cost 
differences 
between 
internal and 
externalized 
workers 
High 
France 
Telecom 
I 
BT 
TDC 
Deutsche Telekom 
AT&T 
II 
Moderate 
 Telecom Italia 
O2 Czech 
Republic 
Orange Polska 
Low 
A1 
III 
 
TeliaSonera 
IV 
  
Low Moderate High 
  Ease of exiting internal employment 
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Figure 4. Comparison of hourly pay levels for call center workers (customer service and sales, 
consumer segment) in US Dollars, based on purchasing power parity (2011-2012, unless otherwise 
stated) 
 
 
Source: Collective agreements, management/union surveys, and interviews  
Note: Comparison categories for each case include: a) in-house; b) subsidiaries and new pay grades (where 
present); c) subcontractors (where used); and d) temporary agencies (where used and where pay is allowed to 
deviate from in-house pay). Employees were no longer hired onto the AT&T Southwest reported “starting 
salary.” We do not have figures for the “top salary” at A1; however, the typical salary is close to the top of the 
pay scale. Agency workers at TS, DT, A1, FT, and TI are on the same pay scale as permanent workers – 
although they would typically be paid close to the starting salary level. The in-house pay rates at DT (2006) 
no longer apply, as all call center workers were moved onto a lower scale at the DTKS subsidiary.  
 
  
 
  
 
